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NOTES
TORTs-DISTINCTION BETWEEN ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE -HOST AND GUEST RELATIONSHIP. - The
two important doctrines of tort law, contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk, are of especial significance in two major fields today.
One of these is the relationship of employer and employee under Em-
ployers' Liability Acts, and the other is the host-guest relationship in
automobile negligence cases. The present discussion will be confined to
the latter relationship.
As early as 1799, the doctrine of contributory negligence was ex-
pressed.' A plaintiff whose own misconduct had contributed to his in-
jury was barred from recovery, provided such misconduct was a
proximate cause of the injury.2 The doctrine of assumption of risk was
a further limitation of the harsh liability placed on negligent actors.
One who, with full knowledge of the dangers of a situation and of his
3 Cruden v. Fenthtm, 2 Esp. 685; Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60 (1809), in
which the doctrine was truly established.
2Randall v. Northwestern Tel. Co., 54 Wis. 140, 11 N.W. 419, 41 Am. Rep. 17
(1882); Buchinonw. Jeffery, 135 Wis. 448, 115 N.W. 372 (1908).
NOTES
rights to protection, voluntarily subjected himself to the danger, was
barred from recovery for a subsequent injury.3
Although the effect of both doctrines is the same, since either
serves to bar plaintiff's recovery, there is a distinct difference in the
theory which underlies each.4 One who assumes a known risk is barred
because of his own voluntary action. Once the defendant has warned
the plaintiff of dangers not apparent, the defendant's duty is performed,
and there remains no further obligation.5 However, the assumption of
risk, to be truly voluntary, must include an opportunity open to the
plaintiff to refuse to accept the danger. There must have been no force,
either actual or implied from the absence of any other course of ac-
tion. The plaintiff must have deliberately chosen to act.6 Assumption of
risk does not admit any idea of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff,
whose acts are not negligent merely because of their voluntariness, ex-
cept, of course, where the risk was so great, and the reason for taking
it so unwarranted, that the assumption of it would be an unreasonable
act, judged by the actions of a reasonable, intelligent, and prudent man
under the same or similar circumstances.7 Neither does the doctrine
mean that the plaintiff consents to be harmed by the danger. He rather
hopes to escape the danger, if possible, in each case.8
Contributory negligence, unlike assumption of risk, presumes a
prima-facie liability on defendant. The defendant can overcome this
liability by showing that the plaintiff has acted or failed to act in such
a way as to violate his self-protective duty, a duty placed upon him
because of the complex civilization in which he finds himself, where
dangers are always present.' The doctrine of contributory negligence
throws on the individual the primary burden of protecting his own in-
terest. The law will not protect a man when common prudence and
caution would be sufficient to guard him. Thus the misconduct of the
plaintiff is the basis of contributory negligence as a bar.10
Before the passage of legislation affecting the two doctrines, the
difficulty of distinguishing between them in the circumstances of each
case was avoided, because either doctrine served to prevent a recovery
by a plaintiff whose own misconduct or assumption of dangers was a
3 Butterfield v. Forrester, supra, note 1.
4 Thomas v. Quarterrnaine, L.R. 18 Q.B.D. 685 (1887).
5 Burr v. Adelphi Theater Co., [1907] 1 K.B. 544.6 Mason v. Yockey, 103 Fed. 265 (C.C.A., 7th, 1900) ; LeDuc v. Northern Pac.
R. R., 92 Minn. 287, 100 N.W. 108 (1904) ; Knipfer v. Shaw, 210 Wis. 617, 246
N.W. 328 (1933).
7 Kavanaugh v. City of Janesville, 24 Wis. 618 (1869).
8 Bohlen, F., "Contributory Negligence," 21 Harv. Law Rev., 233 (1908). The
article explains the basis of assumption of risk as a bar thus: "One cannot
be forced to accept risks, but one may place his private rights in what peril
he please, subject them to what risk he chooses, and he who gives him the
opportunity to do so is no more guilty of a wrong toward him then he, who,
with the consent of the owner, takes his property."
9 Note 8, supra, in which, on the question of deliberation involved in each doc-
trine, the author says, "One guilty of contributory negligence acts unintention-
ally, while he who accepts a risk does so voluntarily."
10 Muller v. McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195 (1878) ; Thomas v. Quartermaine, supra, note
4.
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cause'of his injury." Courts could refuse to grant a recovery on either
theory, and, as long as the evidence justified the finding of one or the
other, there was little danger of a reversal. The early Wisconsin cases
treated a voluntary subjection to known danger as a problem of con-
tributory negligence, attempting only to determine whether the assum-
ing of a great risk was so unreasonable as to be negligence as a matter
of law.12 Later cases adopted this line of reasoning without hesita-
tion.' 3 But in those cases where the doctrine of assumption of risk was
apparently applicable, the courts have spoken of plaintiff's acts as mere-
ly a form of contributory negligence.' 4 Very often the two doctrines
have been applied interchangeably, with the obvious practical predeter- "
mination that the results achieved would be the same with the use of
one or the other.15
But with the enactment of the Employers' Liability Acts, doing
away with the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk in certain cases,16 and later with the passage of the Comparative
Negligence Law, '7 it became highly important to determine whether
the plaintiff's actions were to be deemed contributory negligence or as-
11 Upthegrove v. Jones and Adams Coal Co., 118 Wis. 673, 96 N.W. 385 (1903);
Horn v. La Crosse Box Co., 131 Wis. 384, 11 N.W. 522 (1907); Fandek v.
Barnett and Record Co., 161 Wis. 55, 150 N.W. 537 (1915).
12 Kavanaugh v. City of Janesville, supra, note 7; Kenworthy v. Town of Iron-
ton, 41 Wis. 647 (1877) ; McKeegue, Adn'x. v. City of Janesville, 68 Wis. 50,
31 N.W. 298 (1887).
13 Ottnan v. Wis. Mich. Power Co., 199 Wis. 4, 225 N.W. 179 (1929), where a
painter was held guilty of contributory negligence when he proceeded to work
near wires which he knew were highly charged. See also Reiland and Wife v.
Wis. Valley Elec. Co., 202 Wis. 499, 233 N.W. 91 (1930).
14 See Douglas v. Chli. Milw., and St. P. Ry. Co., 100 Wis. 405, 409, 76 N.W.
356 (1898), where it was held: "If a person enters a railway track after re-
ceiving warning that it is about to be used for the passage of trains, he does
so at his own peril, and if personal injury results, such is attributable to his
contributory negligence." See also Keller v. Port Washington, 200 Wis. 87, 22Z
N.W. 284 (1929).
15 In Haselineler v. The M. E. R. and L. Co., 185 Wis. 210, 213, 201 N.W. 257
(1924), the courts says: "One who voluntarily subjects himself to a danger or
hazard, appreciating the consequences thereof, is held either to have assumed
the risk or be guilty of contributory negligence, as the case may be. And it is
not necessary in order to assume a risk or be guilty of contributory negligence
that he should fully a,)preciate the precise nature of the danger or anticipate
the precise result that actually follows. It is sufficient if he knows that he will
be likely to be seriously injured if he does the act in question." In Keller v.
Port Washington, supra, note 14, the plaintiff voluntarily drove up an icy hill,
knowing its condition. It was held that in driving up the hill he assumed the
risk of slipping, and that assumption of risk was a form of contributory negli-
gence. See also Culbertson, Adanex. v. Milw. and Northern R. R. Co., 88 Wis.
567, 60 N.W. 998 (1894) ; Salzer v. City of Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 471, 73 N.W.
20 (1897). The court expressly notes this failure to distinguish the doctrines,
saying in Fandek v. Barnett and Record Co., 161 Wis. 55, 67, 150 N.W. 537
(1915) : "In Wisconsin, assumption of risk has been spoken of as a species of
contributory negligence. As long as both were complete defenses, no occasion
arose for a sharp distinction between them. In most cases it was a question
for the jury to say in what field the questioned conduct lies, in that of a mere
assumption of risk, or in that of negligence, bearing in mind, however, that
it may enter the latter field through the former as well as otherwise."
16 Chap. 331.37, Wis. Stats.; Title 45 U.S.C.A. 53-59 (c. 149, sec. 3-9, 35 Stat. 66);
Chap. 192.50, Wis. Stats.
'7 Chap. 331.045, Wis. Stats.
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sumption of risk. The distinction is recognized in, the Fandek case,
where it is pointed out that the plaintiff's assuming a great danger,
which assumption would be unreasonable to the mind of an ordinary,
prudent man, would be held to be contributory negligence.'" However,
the Keller case reasserted the earlier holdings that the doctrines are
interchangeable.' 9
It is interesting to note that, with the beginnings of automobile law
in Wisconsin, the two doctrines were applied in much the same man-
ner as they had been developed in the English cases regarding land
owners and licensees.2 0 In those cases, the English courts had ap-
proached the problem of a landowner's liability to a person coming on
the land from the view point of the particular duty which the owner
owed to the licensee, invitee, or trespasser.2 ' The suggestion of an ab-
solute duty was soon done away with by an investigation into what
position the plaintiff occupied with respect to the owner. As to li-
censees, the rule was early adopted that an owner owes no duty to a
bare licensee other than to warn of hidden dangers.2 2 But the owner
did owe a duty not to increase the danger or add a new one. 23 The
owner's duties were thus firmly established, and as a result of their
limitations, the licensee was obliged to take the premises as he found
them, apart from any hidden defects.24 The English courts viewed a
18 Note 11, supra. Here the action was brought for the death of an employee,
under the Employers' Liability Act. The jury found that the deceased, work-
ing in removing plates from spouts placed one above the other, without having
first observed the dangerous position in which the top one stood, was guilty of
contributory negligence causing the injury which resulted when the top spout
fell, and not of assumption of risk. The court said (at p. 64) : "The assuming
of such risks as ordinary careful and prudent men similarly situated usually
assume is within the field of assumption of risk, whether assumed knowingly
or ignorantly. But the assuming of such risks as are more hazardous than
those constitutes contributory negligence, and it is immaterial whether the
risk is assumed knowingly or ignorantly through want of ordinary care."
'1 Note 14, supra.
20 O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N.W. 525 (1921).
21 In Lowery v. Walker, L.R. [1910] 1 K.B. 173, 183, Williams, L. J., indicates
this approach: "There cannot be negligence in the legal sense unless there is
some duty which the defendant has failed to observe, and the existence of a
duty of the defendant to such or such a thing."
22 Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247, 250 (1856). In that case, the plaintiff, a
social guest of the defendant hotel owner, was injured when, upon his leav-
ing, the glass in the door fell upon him. The defendant, though found negli-
gent, was not held liable. Pollock, C. B., after stating that an employer need
not take more care of an employee than he can reasonably be expected to take
of himself, continues: "The same principle applies to the case of a visitor at a
house; whilst he remains there he is in the same position as any other member
of the establishment, so far as regards the negligence of the master or his
servants, and he must take his chance with the rest." Hounsell v. Smyth, 7 C.B.
732 (1860) ; Bolch v. Smith, 7 H. & N. 736 (1862) ; Gallagher v. Humphrey,
6 L.T. 684 (1862) ; Ivay v. Hedges, L.R. 9 Q.B.D. 80 (1882); Indermaur v.
Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866); Batchelor v. Forstecue, L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 474
(1883) ; Kinber v. Gas Light and Coke Co., 87 L.J. 651, 118 L.T. 562 (K.B.,
1918). As to duty to warn of hidden danger, see Corby v. Hill, 4 C.B. (N.S.)
556 (1858) ; Robbins v. Jones, 16 C.B. (N.S.) 221 (1864); Gantret v. Egerton,
L.R. 2 C.P. 371 (1867). As to duty to trespassers, see Lowery v. Walker, supra,
note 21; and to licensees with an interest, see Indernzaur v. Dcnes, supra.
23 Gallagher v. Humphrey, supra, note 22; Lowery v. Walker, supra, note 21.
24Southcote v. Stanley, supra, note 22; Lathain v. Johnson, L.R. [1913] 1 K.B.
406. See also Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834 (1921).
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man's home and its premises in the traditional light, as a man's "castle,"
built especially to protect his family. A guest could invariably expect a
great degree of security upon entering the household, being assured of
the same protection as his host had designed for its members.
In Wisconsin, the early automobile cases upon which our present
rules are based accepted the licensor-licensee relationship as the one
most closely approximating that of driver and occupant of a private
vehicle, and consequently held the occupant to have accepted the car
as he found it, except for unknown defects. 25 The fallacy of such an
analogy between host and guest on the land of the host, and host and
guest in an automobile driven by the host, lay chiefly in the great dif-
ference in the degree of security to be found in each. A man's auto-
mobile, though in a condition beyond reproach, and though being driv-
en carefully and at a reasonable rate of speed, is by no means a man's
"castle." The protection assured to a guest in a home cannot possibly
be extended to one traveling in an automobile upon a busy highway.
Apparently the Wisconsin court realized this difference when decid-
ing Mitchell v. Raymond,26 in which the duty of using ordinary care
to avoid injury to the guest was placed upon the automobile host. But
soon thereafter this duty was greatly modified, so that once more the
host owed only a slight duty to the guest, namely that of refraining
from increasing the danger to the guest, or adding a new danger.2 7 The
latter rule has been adhered to in all succeeding cases down to the
present.
28
Consistent with the duty of self-protection which falls upon every
person, the court placed upon the automobile guest the duty of using
reasonable care for his own safety, such duty being specifically to keep
a lookout, warning the driver of approaching danger, and to protest
against excessive speed and dangerous driving practices.2 9 Failure of
25 O'Shea v. Lavoy, supra, note 20.
26181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855 (1923). The rule was affirmed in Vogel v. Otto,
182 Wis. 1, 195 N.W. 859 (1923) ; Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268, 201 N.W. 752(1925) ; Harding v. Jesse, 189 Wis. 652, 207 N.W. 706 (1926) ; and Bryden v.
Priem, 190 Wis. 483, 209 N.W. 703 (1926).
27 Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267, 51 A.L.R. 576 (1926). The court
adopts the reasoning of the property cases as expressed in Greenfield v. Miller,
supra, note 24, when it asks: "Should a guest be able to demand of his host a
degree of skill for the guest's security, which the host is unable to exercise for
his own protection?"
28 Summerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929) ; Grandhagen v.
Grandhagen, 199 Wis. 315, 225 N.W. 925 (1929); Hainus v. Weber, 199 Wis.
320, 226 N.W. 392 (1929); Schmidt v. Leuthener, 199 Wis. 567, 227 N.W. 17
(1929) ; Hejin v. Bluhm, 200 Wis. 321, 228 N.W. 599 (1930) ; Poneitowcki v.
Harres, 200 Wis. 504, 228 N.W. 126 (1930), in which the hosts' duties were
expressed, namely: to maintain a reasonable speed, to obey the laws of the
road, and to keep a proper lookout; Brockhaus v. Neivmann, 201 Wis. 57, 228
N.W. 477 (1930) ; Sweet v. Underwriters' Casualty Co., 206 Wis. 447, 240 N.W.
199 (1932) ; Harter v. Dicknan, 209 Wis. 289, 245 N.W. 157 (1932) ; Krantz v.
Krants, 211 Wis. 249, 248 N.W. 156 (1933) ; Cum'mings v. Nelson, (Wis. 1933)
250 N.W. 759.
29 Howe v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N.W. 791 (1920) ; Wappler v. Schenck, 178
Wis. 632, 190 N.W. 555 (1922) ;. Harding v. Jesse, 189 Wis. 652, 207 N.W. 706(1926) ; Krause v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 570, 217 N.W. 290 (1928), in which, in
regard to protest by the guest, the court says: "No case has yet defined the
amount of protest necessary to relieve the guest of contributory negligence as a
matter of law;" Goehnann v. National Biscuit Co., 204 Wis. 427, 235 N.W.
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the guest -to perform these duties made him guilty of contributory neg-
ligence.
In addition to these duties, and correlated with them, the burden
upon the' guest to take proper measures for his own safety was in-
creased by the extension of the doctrine of assumption of risk to the
skill and driving habits of the host. The guest assumes the risk of in-
jury due to the host's lack of skill or incompetence, whether such is
known to the guest or not, and to the usual driving habits and prac-
tices of the host, known to the guest.3 0 The necessary elements of a
complete assumption of risk by the guest have been clearly defined in
Knipfer v. Shaw.31 First, there must be a hazard or danger inconsistent
with the safety of the guest. Second, the guest must have a knowledge
and appreciation of the hazard. And third, there must be acquiescence
or willingness on the part of the guest to proceed in the face of danger.
In reviewing the application of the doctrines of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence, it is found that even before the advent of
the automobile, the guest in a private vehicle assumed the risk of skill
and care of the person guiding it.32 The O'Shea case established the
rule for automobiles, holding the guest to have assumed the risk of in-jury due to the condition of the car, except for unknown defects.3 3 The
792 (1931), making an exception to the rule in the case of emergencies or
momentary management of the car; Biersach v. Wechlselberg, 206 Wis. 113,
238 N.W. 905 (1931) ; Rock v. Sarazen, 209 Wis. 126, 244 N.W. 577 (1932) ;
Kull v. Adv. Rumley Threshing Co., 209 Wis. 565, 245 N.W. 589 (1932);
Crane v. Weber, 211 Wis. 294, 247 N.W. 882 (1933).
30 Olson v. Her, wansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N.W. 203, 61 A.L.R. 243 (1928) ; Krue-
ger v. Kreuger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N.W. 784 (1929); Sinrmerfield v. Flury,
supra, note 28; Grandhagen v. Grandhagen, supra, note 28; Page v. Page, 199
Wis. 641, 227 N.W. 233 (1929) ; Heim v. Bldrm, supra, note 28, Brockhaus v.
Neumann, supra, note 28, in which assumption of risk was also extended, as
in the Sicwmmerfield case, supra, to the dangers necessarily incident to the char-
acter of the trip; Royer v. Saecker, 204 Wis. 265, 234 N.W. 742 (1931) ; Fon-
taine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410 (1931) ; Biersach v. Wechselberg,
supra, note 29, which case expressly repudiated the rule of Knauer v. Schlitz,
159 Wis. 7, 149 N.W. 494 (1914), limiting the application of assumption of
risk to contract only, and also held that acquiescence in unlawful speed or
reckless driving includes an assumption of the risk of resulting injuries;
Ganzer v. Weed, 209 Wis. 135, 244 N.W. 588 (1932); Harter v. Dickman,
supra, note 28, which states that there is no assumption of the risk of injury
resulting from the host's failure to keep a careful lookout.
31210 Wis. 617, 246 N.W. 328 (1933). Here the plaintiff guest was driving in an
extremely dense fog with her husband. She was watching the right side of
the road, while he watched the front and left side. It was impossible to see
more than thirty feet ahead. The plaintiff was injured in a collision with a
car approaching from the opposite direction. The court held that, as a matter
of law, the plaintiff had fully assumed the risk by continuing to ride under
such conditions.
32 Prideauz v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878).
33 O'Shea v. Lavoy, supra, note 20, at p. 462. The injury resulted from a defec-
tive spring which had been repaired. Court found that this was not a "trap,"
and that guest could not recover, saying that there was no difference between
"an invitation extended to a person to dine with him and an invitation ex-
tended to ride with him." In Waters v. Markham, 204 Wis. 332, 235 N'.W.
797 (1931), injury resulted from a defective tire. The court said the host was
liable if he knew of a defective condition existing, and realized, or should have
realized, that it involved an unreasonable risk to his guest, to whom the de-
fect was not known or apparent. See also Rawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis.
189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932), and Campbell v. Spaeth, (Wis. 1933) 250 N.W. 393.
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skill and competence of the driver, whether know or unknown, as well
as the known driving habits and practices of the driver, were later held
to be assumed by the guest.3 4 But these were not the only risks assumed
by the guest. Where the guest acquiesced in the host's excessive speed,
the guest has been held to have assumed the risk of injuries resulting
from such speed.3 5 Also, where the guest acquiesced in a course of
reckless driving that persisted long enough for the guest to protest, he
assumed the risk of resulting injury; and such acquiescence cannot be
separated from the guest's inability to protest after a subsequent emer-
gency has arisen.3 6 If the character of the trip was such as to involve
obvious risks to the guest, he has been held to have assumed those
risks by making the journey.37 The guest assumed the risk of injury
by riding with a tired host, when the guest knew that the host had had
little sleep, and had driven for hours without resting.38 But it has been
held that under ordinary circumstances, the guest does not assume the
risk of injury caused by the host's failure to keep a lookout.3 9 The con-
4 Olson v. Hermansen, supra, note 30, in this case the guest was killed when the
car overturned when the host made an effort to swerve sharply to avoid striking
dogs which had suddenly darted onto the road. It was held that the guest had
assumed the risk of the injury, since it was due to the host's lack of skill and
driving proficiency.
a Harding v. Jesse, supra, note 26, the plaintiff and his wife, guests in the car,
knew that the brakes had become loosened. Plaintiff's wife asked the host to
hurry back to town. The host did, and a collision resulted. The court held
the guests' failure to protest the excessive speed to be contributory negligence
as a matter of law, and barred recovery. Any risk of injury which'might re-
sult was assumed. The court says, (p. 658) : "A gratuitous guest cannot sit
idly by, observe clear violations of the law, in fact acquiesce in them, and
'then, in the event of an accident, hold his host liable in damages."
36 Young v. Nunn-Bush Weldon Co., (Wis. 1933) 249 N.W. 278. The guest had
known the host's driving habits. Just before the accident, the host had been
speeding. In passing a truck on the right, the host was forced to veer sharply
into a post in order to avoid hitting the truck, which had suddenly turned in
to the right. It was held that assuming the risk of the speeding and passing on
the right side barred the guest's recovery, since the guest must also have as-
sumed the risk of the emergency created by those acts. See also Biersach v.
Wechselberg, supra, note 30, where it was said that acquiescence in excessive
speed or unlawful driving was assumption of risk.
37 Sumnerfield v. Flury, supra, note 28, in which several guests had accompanied
the driver on his way to assist in fighting a fire. The court held here that the
question of whether the guests should have reasonably anticipated some in-jury should have been put to the jury. In Knipfer v. Shaw, supra, note 31, the
assumption was based on continuing a journey under dangerous conditions,
but the same question might logically have governed. In Brockhaus v. Neu-
mann, supra, note 28, the assumption was held to have been of the manner in
which the trip was made, where, in making a sharp turn at an unexpected
curve in the road, the car overturned. The guest was one of a party traveling
to a football game. It must be said, however, that the court emphasized the
fact that this holding was limited to the particular circumstances of the case.
See also Walker V. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., et al., (Wis. 1934) 252
N.W. 721, in which, as against the host, the guest was held to have assumed
the risk of injury in riding, on a foggy night, where it was impossible to
keep a careful lookout at the rate of thirty-five to forty miles an hour.
38 Krueger v. Krueger, supra, note 30; but see Krantz v. Krantz, supra, note 28,
where the guest was not barred when he did not know, and had no reason
to believe that his host was tired, and injury resulted when host fell asleep
at the wheel.
" Harter v. Dickman, note 30, supra; and Cunmings v. Nelson, supra, note 28,
where the guest was injured when the host's car struck a barrier, at night, at a
NOTES
tributory negligence of the guest, on the other hand, lay chiefly in his
failure to protest against excessive speed or unlawful driving practices,
and in failure to keep a proper lookout and warn of approaching dan-
gers.4
0
There has been some slight confusion as to whether a guest's ac-
quiescence in excessive speed and unlawful driving practices should be
termed assumption of risk or contributory negligence.4 1 But the appli-
cation of either doctrine served to bar the plaintiff, and the intermin-
gling of the two was, from a practical viewpoint, immaterial. However,
with the passing of the Comparative Negligence Law in Wisconsin, a
confusion of the two doctrines should no longer be so considered, since
contributory negligence, where it is less than the negligence of the party
against whom recovery is sought, namely, the host, is no longer a bar,
while assumption of risk, in strict legal theory, remains to prevent a
recovery.4 2
As between host and guest, the problem of applying the two doc-
trines is relatively simple, but when the, suit is by the guest against the
host and a third party whose actions have, together with the negligence
of the host, caused the injury, several difficulties arise under the Com-
parative Negligence Law. Before the act was passed, the negligence of
point where the highway was under construction. The host was found negli-
gent as to his lookout ,but the guest was found to have kept a careful lookout.
The court reasserted the rule that a host owes the guest the duty of maintain-
ing a proper lookout, and said: "That duty is unaffected by the rule as to the
qualified care which a host owes to a guest" citing Poneitowcki v. Harris,
supra, note 28.
40 See note 29.4 1 Harding v. Jesse, supra, note 29, termed such action by the guest contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The court in Biersach v. Wechselberg, supra,
note 29, held the acquiescence to be an assumption of risk, saying (at p. 118) :
"We see no reason why the term 'assumption of risk' should not be used in
instructing a jury with respect to the duty of a guest to exercise due care for
his own safety. The circumstances which attend the ordinary host and guest
relationship are such as to suggest use of the term 'assumption of risk' as op-
posed to 'contributory negligence,' whatever the differences and likenesses of
the two terms may be when subjected to a critical legal analysis. When the
evidence presents an issue of assumption of risk, it should be presented to the
jury." But the later case of Haines v. Duffy, 206 Wis. 193, 196, 240 N.W. 152
(1931), held the acquiescence to bar recovery "not, strictly speaking, because
of contributory negligence, but since it would be against reason and justice
to permit a recovery against a host under such circumstances. The guest has
a duty to protest against excessive speed. Failure to do so is termed contribu-
tory negligence. It is not, strictly speaking, contributory negligence. The duty
grows out of the host and guest relationship and is an essential factor in
whether the guest can recover from the host." That concept was further devel-
oped in Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, (Wis. 1933) 250 N.W. 441, where an infant guest
was barred from recovery, even though he was, as a matter of law, unable
to assume a risk, on the ground that the host owed no duty to a guest in the
way of exercising a greater protection for the guest than he could exercise
for his own protection. "While it is stated in several opinions of this court
that the guest assumes the risk incident to the degree of skill possessed by the
host, this is not the fundamental ground upon which the exception of a host
from liability to a guest for injury sustained through lack of experience of the
host is based. The fundamental basis of the exemption is that the host has
not violated any duty owed to the guest."
42 Campbell, Richard V., "Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law," 7 Wis.
Law Rev. 222. After stating that the act is intended to include contributory
negligence, Prof. Campbell continues, (at p. 241) : "On the other hand, the act
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the host was held not to be imputed to the guest.43 A guest free of con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk could recover from a third
party, even though his host concurred in causing the injury.44 The third
party could then recover contribution from the host on the ground that
both had been subjected to a common liability.45 But where the guest
had assumed the risks of the acts of the host, which acts operated as
a cause of the injury, the guest could not recover from the third per-
son.46 The guest was also barred where his own contributory negli-
gence operated as a cause of the injury. 7 The first application under
the statute was made in Cameron v. Union Automobile Insurance Co., 48
in which the court held that the guest assumed the risk of the injury,
by riding with the host, when the injury was sustained through the
host's customary method of driving, but that the guest did not, by so
riding, assume the risk of injury caused by the negligence of other
users of the highway than the host, unless the acts of the host in which
the guest acquiesced operated as a cause of the collision. The latest
available case of an injury to a guest caused by the negligence of the
host and a third party holds that an assumption of risk of the host's
acts will bar a recovery as against him, but that as against the third
party, the negligence of the guest must be considered separately in re-
lation to the total negligence involved, and damages merely diminished
accordingly. The third person cannot recover contribution from the
host unless there is a common liability existing between the third per-
son and the host. Thus, where a host is freed of liability toward the
guest by the latter's assumption of risk, the third person can recover
no contribution from the host.49
does not alter the rule that a person coming in contact with a dangerous condi-
tion in the exercise of a privilege derived from the consent of the one responsible
for the condition is unable to recover where he is fully aware of the danger
and risk involved. It was only intended to change the defense of contributory
negligence or fault." In Pryor v. Williams, 254 U.S. 43, 41 Sup. Ct. 36, 65 L.Ed.
121 (1920), the court held a charge by the lower court that assumption of risk
should be treated as contributory negligence in mitigating damages under the
comparative negligence section of the Employers' Liability Act, supra, note 16,
was error, stating that assumption of risk is still a bar, not being affected by
a comparative negligence statute. See also Canzeron v. Union Automobile In-
surance Co., 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420 (1932), where assumption of risk
barred a recovery against the host for an injury occurring after the passage
of the Comparative Negligence Law.4 3 Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739 (1921), overruling the doctrine
of Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878) ;Brubacher v. Iowa
County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690 (1921).
44 Wiese v. Polzer, (Wis. 1933) 248 N.W. 113. Here the guest, riding on the fen-
der of host's truck, was barred from a recovery against either the host or the
third party on the ground of contributory negligence.
45Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Runquist, 209 Wis. 97, 244 N.W. 757(1932).46 Wiese v. Polzer, supra, note 44.
4 Waitkus v. Chicago and N. W. R. Co., 204 Wis. 566, 236 N.W. 531 (1931).
48210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420 (1933).
49 Walker v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., supra, note 37. Had Weise v.
Polzer, supra, note 44, fallen under the statute, the actions of the plaintiff in
that case would probably have been held to constitute a greater amount of
negligence than that of the defendant host and the third party combined, so
that plaintiff would still be barred. But, assuming that such negligence was less,
the court might yet bar a recovery on the ground that the plaintiff, even as
NOTES
The suggestion has been made that Wisconsin adopt a "reckless
operation statute" such as obtains in several of our states.5 0 Such a stat-
ute would hold the host liable only for gross negligence. Undoubtedly,
such a law would simplify the host and guest duty problem, but it is
submitted that with a careful distinction made between the doctrines of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence in their application to
the circumstances of the individual case, the automobile host is not
without sufficient defenses under the present status of our law. How-
ever, the Comparative Negligence Law demands a more careful sub-
mission of the distinction between the two doctrines when the facts
of each case are presented to the jury for decision.51 If the two doc-
trines are to remain, it is important that the courts enforce assumption
of risk as a bar, under the statute, and restrict the application of the
statute to contributory negligence alone.
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against the third party, has assumed the risk of injury, by taking the position
he did.
50 Meissner, H. V., "Liability of Automobile Drivers to Gratuitous Passengers
under the Wisconsin Law," 18 Marq. Law Rev. 3, 16, note 55.
51 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 58 L.Ed. 1063, 1067 (1914).
This was an action by a railroad engineer against his employer. The employee
,vas injured when a defective water gauge exploded. The employee, knowing
of the defect, had requested a new glass for the gauge, but none was available.
The plaintiff continued to operate the train with the defect not repaired. The
lower court submitted three questions to the jury: "(1) Was the plaintiff in-
jured by defendant's negligence? (Yes.) (2) If so, did plaintiff assume the
risk of injury? (No.) (3) Did plaintiff by his own negligence contribute to
the injury? (Yes.)" The defendant had requested an instruction that "If you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the gauge was not provided with
a guard glass, was open and obvious and was fully known to plaintiff, and
he continued to use such gauge with such knowledge and without objection,
and that he knew the risk incident thereto, then the court charges you that
the plaintiff assumed the risk incident to such use, and you will answer the
second question "Yes." The Supreme Court found the submission of the in-
struction asked in regard to contributory negligence only to be error, and that
defendant was entitled to the instruction as requested. The Employers' Lia-
bility Act, under which this action was brought, provided for diminution of
damages under comparative negligence, where the employee was contributorily
negligent. Thus it was important to determine whether the employee assumed
the risk, since assumption of risk would still serve as a bar, while contributory
negligence as found merely served to mitigate the damages.
